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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5570
Does related lending have positive or negative effects on 
the development of banking systems? This paper analyzes 
a unique cross-country data set covering 74 countries 
from 1990 to 2007, and finds that related lending, on 
average, does not have any effect on the growth of credit. 
The authors do find, however, that there are conditional 
relationships: related lending tends to retard the growth 
of banking systems when rule of law is weak, while it 
tends to promote the growth of banking systems when 
rule of law is strong. They also find that related lending 
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appears to be associated with looting when banks are 
owned by non-financial firms, but that it does not when 
non-financial firms are owned by banks. The results 
indicate that whether related lending is positive or 
pernicious depends critically on the institutional context 
in which it takes place; there is no single “best policy” 
regarding related lending. These findings are robust to 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a broad consensus that bankers in developing countries engage in related lending. They 
commonly extend credit to firms owned by their close business associates, members of their own 
families or clans, or businesses that they own themselves.  There is not yet a consensus, however, 
as to whether this is positive or pernicious. Broadly speaking, there are two competing views.   
The first, the looting view, which is informed by recent LDC financial crises and which 
has come to be the conventional wisdom at multilateral aid organizations, holds that related 
lending is pernicious.  It allows insiders (bank directors) to expropriate outsiders (minority 
shareholders, depositors, and, when there is under-funded deposit insurance, taxpayers).  The 
incentives for insiders to expropriate the outsiders are particularly strong during an economic 
crisis, when the insiders have reason to use the resources of the bank to rescue their other 
enterprises  (Akerlof and Romer, 1993; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 
1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998b; Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman, 2000;  Johnson, La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000;  Laeven, 2001;  Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002; Mitton, 
2002;  Habyarimana, 2003; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa, 2003).
1   Outsiders, of 
course, know that they may be expropriated, and therefore behave accordingly: they refrain from 
investing their wealth in banks, either as shareholders or depositors.  The combined effect of 
tunneling by directors, the resulting instability of the banking system, and the reluctance of 
outsiders to deploy their wealth in banks is a small banking system.   
The second, the information view, which is informed by the economic histories of the 
United States, Germany, and Japan, is that related lending has a positive effect on the 
development of banking systems: it allows banks to overcome information asymmetries, and 
creates mechanisms for bankers to monitor borrowers (Gerschenkron, 1962; Aoki, Patrick, and 
Sheard, 1994; Lamoreaux, 1994; Calomiris, 1995; Fohlin, 1998).   Scholars who stress this view 
of related lending would wonder why, if related lending is pernicious, it characterized the 
banking systems of advanced industrial countries during their periods of rapid growth.  They 
                                                 
1 In a crisis, loan repayment by unrelated parties worsens, and thus it becomes more difficult to reimburse depositors 
and continue operating as a bank.  The insiders therefore find it in their interest to make loans to themselves, and 
then default on those loans in order to save their non-bank enterprises.   3 
 
would also make the point that related lending is still widespread in those same countries 
(Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). 
Not only do the looting and information views differ from each other in terms of the 
potential effects of related lending on the development of banking systems, but they also have 
entirely different policy implications. The looting view can be used to justify stringent regulatory 
restrictions on cross-ownership between banks and non-financial firms and/or quotas on the 
amount of loans to related parties so as to reduce the opportunities of bank insiders to expropriate 
outsiders. The information view of related lending suggests that such regulatory restrictions 
might be counterproductive:  they are likely to diminish the ability of banks to overcome 
asymmetric information problems.   
One reason why the literature has given rise to these two, quite stark, views of related 
lending is sample selection bias.  The fundamental problem is that, as a practical matter, it is only 
possible to observe related lending directly using ex-post measures—and that ex-post evidence is 
not randomly distributed across countries or time. Consider, for example, the literature on related 
lending as looting: the loan books on which these studies are based are available precisely 
because the banks were intervened by governments in the aftermath of banking crises 
characterized by tunneling and fraud.  Countries in which related lending was positive for the 
development of the banking system do not figure in these studies: because there was no looting, 
there was no crisis; because there was no crisis, there was no government intervention; and 
because there was no intervention, there are no loan books in the public domain. A similar 
problem affects the literature that views related lending positively—as a mechanism to overcome 
information asymmetries. It is not an accident that studies that advance this view are all based on 
historical evidence. The loan books that inform these studies are in the public domain precisely 
because of the antiquity and durability of the banks.  Banks that did not survive for very long, 
because they were looted by their own directors, were less likely produce loan books that could 
one day find their way into an archive or library.  
The primary goal of this paper is to improve the quality of the causal inferences that may 
be drawn from the empirical evidence about related lending. In order to do so, we move away 
from ex-post measures.  Instead, equipped with the cross-country data on the restriction on cross-4 
 
ownership between banks and non-financial firms, we develop an index of related lending that is 
based on the ex ante probability that it is occurring.  We are able to code this index for 74 
countries around the world.  Capturing variance across countries allows us to examine the 
possibility of nonlinearity and move away from the typical ―good‖ or ―bad‖ view of related 
lending, and investigate whether the institutional environment alters the manner in which related 
lending retards (or promotes) the development of the banking system. We advance and test the 
hypotheses that rule of law and depositor monitoring affect the relationship between related 
lending and the growth of banking systems. We also test the hypothesis that the direction of 
relatedness matters: when non-financial firms own banks, they are likely to tunnel into the bank 
in a crisis; but when banks own non-financial firms tunneling during a crisis is less likely.  
This inquiry is motivated by several bodies of literature. The first is the rapidly growing 
and methodologically diverse literature on the finance-growth nexus.  A large body of 
scholarship all points to the same conclusions: financial development exerts an independent, 
causal effect on growth; and banks are a crucial piece of the overall process of financial 
development—indeed, they typically dominate securities markets during the early stages of 
economic development.  This work includes historical case studies of developed economies 
(Sylla 1969, 2007; Neal 1990; de Vries and van der Woude 1997; Rousseau and Wachtel 1998; 
Rousseau and Sylla 2004); cross-country regressions (King and Levine 1993a, 1993b; Levine 
and Zervos 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000); time series analyses of regions within 
countries (Jayartne and Strahan 1996; Black and Strahan 2002; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
2004; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2007); and time series analysis of industries (Haber 1991; 
Rajan and Zingales 1998a; Wurgler 2000; Beck and Levine 2002; Fisman and Love 2004; 
Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Maurer and Haber 2007).  There are, of course, scholars who are not 
persuaded by this evidence, and, in light of the recent financial crisis, view the growth of credit 
as pernicious.  And indeed, there is some evidence that a positive long-run relationship between 
financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a mostly negative short-run 
relationship (Loayza and Ranciere 2006).We note, however, that the usefulness our inquiry about 
related lending does not hinge on the existence of a finance-growth nexus.  Even if credit 
expansion has negative consequences for growth, because it contributes to financial crises, the 
finding that related lending is associated with credit growth is still of relevance to both 
academics and policy makers.  5 
 
The second is the literature on institutions and growth.  There is now a quite broad body 
of work that shows that indices of institutional quality (rule of law, property rights, and the like) 
are strongly correlated with growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zaido-
Lobaton, 1999). A related body of work shows that indices of institutional quality are strongly 
correlated with the use of external sources of long-term finance by firms (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1998). A growing literature shows that the link between institutions and growth is 
causal (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2005). 
The third is the literature on depositor monitoring.   This literature suggests that generous 
deposit insurance lessens depositors’ incentives to monitor the activities of their banks, resulting 
in greater banking sector instability and slower banking sector development (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Kane, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004).   
It follows that related lending is likely to have positive effects on the development of 
banking systems when strong rule of law protects depositors and minority shareholders from 
looting by bank insiders and when there are binding constraints on deposit insurance.  In point of 
fact, both features were present in the case that is often cited as strong evidence for the positive 
view of related lending: New England during the nineteenth century (Lamoreaux 1994).  Both 
features were also noticeably absent in the case that is often cited as strong evidence for the view 
that related lending is a manifestation of looting: Mexico from 1995 to 1998 (La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, and Zamarripa, 2003). 
We find three notable empirical results. First, our analysis reveals no clear relationship 
between regulatory restrictions on related lending and the growth of banking systems; i.e., the 
average effects of related lending are neither positive nor negative. However, when we allow the 
effects of related lending to vary with rule of law, we find that related lending has negative 
effects on the development of banking systems only in countries where rule of law is weak and 
that it has positive effects where rule of law is strong. These results suggest that when judicial 
systems are corrupt and public officials can enforce laws and regulations selectively, bank 
insiders are more likely to be able to expropriate bank outsiders with impunity, resulting in a 
small banking system. Second, unlike the rule of law, depositor monitoring does not seem to 
affect the statistical relationship between related lending and the development of banking 6 
 
systems, suggesting that this monitoring might not be an effective mechanism to curtail potential 
looting by bankers.  Third, the direction of relatedness matters: regulations that allow non-
financial companies to own banks appear to create incentives for the owners of those firms to 
save those firms during an economic crisis by looting their banks; but this effect does not appear 
to exist when banks own non-financial companies. Taken together, our findings indicate that a 
negative or positive view of related lending might be too simplistic: the effects of related lending 
might depend on the institutional environment. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our data and 
empirical methods. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 decomposes the mechanisms 
that underpin our main results.  Section 5 presents a series of robustness checks. In section 6 we 
offer concluding remarks. 
2.  Data and Methods 
Our basic empirical strategy is to relate the growth of private credit to regulatory restrictions on 
related lending, while controlling for macroeconomic factors and institutional features that might 
also affect credit growth. In order to carry this out, we assemble a data set on credit growth, the 
extent of related lending, the strength of the rule of law, and the intensity of depositor monitoring 
for 74 countries from 1990-2007.
2  We then employ this data set to estimate regressions designed 
to determine whether related lending is, on average, positively or negatively associated with the 
growth of bank credit, and whether the relationship between related lending and the growth of 
private credit depends on the strength of rule of law and depositor monitoring. In this section, we 
first describe how we measure our key variables, and then present our regression model.  
2.1  Measurement and Data 
A.  Financial System Development 
Our primary measure of banking system development is the ratio of private credit to GDP, which 
is a common metric employed in the literature (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000; Do 
and Levchenko, 2007).    More formally, for country i we compute the average annual rate of 
growth of the indicator as: 
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T in our case is 17 since 1991 is the first year for which a growth rate can be computed.  Credit 
Growth is used as a dependent variable that captures banking development. The data on private 
credit is obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database, while GDP is from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
B.  Related Lending 
Because regulatory authorities in many countries do not require banks to report the percentage of 
loans made to related parties, and because even those that do have such requirements do not 
employ uniform definitions of a related party, a key challenge is measuring the extent of related 
lending across countries. It seems highly likely, however, that related lending is more prevalent 
in countries where regulators are more tolerant of cross-ownership between banks and non-
financial firms and where restrictions on the ownership of bank capital by related parties or a 
single owner are less binding. Indeed, in nineteenth century New England, which is perhaps the 
quintessential case of the rapid development of a banking system on the basis of related lending, 
state regulators were quite tolerant of the fact that the owners of the major industrial firms were 
also the owners of the banks, and that the ownership of bank stock tended to be highly 
concentrated among a small group of individuals. Indeed, the banks were essentially the treasury 
arms of family-run manufacturing companies (Lamoreaux 1994).  We therefore construct a 
proxy for the prevalence of related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and 
supervision created by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (hereafter BCL, 2000, 2003).
3  Box 1 reports 
the questions that underlie our proxy. The first two questions refer to the ownership structure of 
banks (the maximum share that a single entity or individual may own, and the maximum that a 
related party may own).  The second two refer to the degree to which banks are restricted from 
owning non-financial firms, and vice versa. Survey responses come from the regulatory and 
supervisory authorities in each country. 
                                                 












We rescale the qualitative responses to questions 3 and 4 on ownership inter-linkages 
with non-financial firms (prohibited, restricted, permitted subject to certain stipulations, and 
unrestricted) so that they conform to the responses from the first two questions (scaled from 0 to 
100).  We assign ―prohibited‖ a value of 0, ―restricted‖ a value of 33.3, ―permitted‖ a value of 
66.7, and ―unrestricted‖ a value of 100.  Our index of related lending, Related Lending, is the 
simple average of the responses to the four questions.
4  
As Box 2 indicates, some of the responses to the questions are significantly correlated, 
especially questions 1 and 2 (the percentage ownership limits of banks for individual entities and 
related parties).  To a lesser extent, responses to those two questions are also correlated with the 
responses to question 3 (limits on non-financial firms’ ownership of banks).  By contrast, the 
responses to question 4 (limits on bank ownership of non-financial firms) are not significantly 
correlated with the responses to any of the other questions.  Despite some significant 
correlations, the overall pattern suggests that each question provides a separate source of 
information. In robustness checks below, we de-compose our index into individual components 
that isolate the effects of each type of restriction on private credit growth.  
                                                 
4 The BCL questions in Box 1 were asked in 1998-99 and again in 2002, and thus we have two observations for our 
index of related lending for each country. We compute the index for each country using the 1998-99 responses and 
assign that value to all observations prior to 2002.  For observations after 2002, we use the responses to the 2002 
survey.  We then take the average of those two observations for each country (weighted by the number of pre- and 
post-2002 observations), which we use in the regressions.  As a practical matter, there was not much variance in 
responses from the 1998-99 survey to the 2002 survey.  Thus, our results are not sensitive to the weighting scheme.   
Box 1.  Questions on Relatedness 
(from Barth, Caprio, and Levine database of Bank Regulation and Supervision 2000, 2003) 
 
1.  What is the maximum percentage of bank capital that can be owned by a single 
owner [0-100]? 
2.  What is the maximum percentage of a bank’s capital that can be owned by a 
related party [0-100]? 
3.  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for non-financial firms’ 
ownership of a bank [0 = Prohibited; 33.3 = Restricted; 66.7 =Permitted, with 
prior authorization or approval; 100=Unrestricted]? 
4.  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank ownership of non-
financial firms [0 = Prohibited; 33.3 = Restricted to some figure below 100 
percent; 66.7 = Permitted to own 100 percent of equity, but ownership is 
limited based on the bank’s equity capital; 100 = Unrestricted, a bank may own 
100 percent of the equity of any non-financial firm]? 9 
 
Box 2. Pairwise Correlations for Components of Related Lending Index 





Bank Ownership of 
Non-Financial Firms 
Single Owner Limit   1       
  [n=74]       
         
Related Party Limit  0.758***  1     
  [n=74]  [n=74]     
         
Non-Financial Firm   0.474***  0.482***  1   
Ownership of Banks  [n=74]  [n=74]  [n=74]   
         
Bank Ownership of  -0.027  0.087  0.079  1 
Non-Financial Firms
  [n=74]  [n=74]  [n=74]  [n=74] 
         
*** indicates p<0.01. 
C.  Rule of Law 
In order to measure the strength of the rule of law we use the index developed by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, hereafter KKZ). The KKZ data are available for 1996, 1998, 
2000, and then annually from 2002 to 2008.
5 We use the index values from 2004 because it is 
close to coterminous with the 2003 BCL survey, and because it offers wider country coverage 
than the 2002 survey. We note that our results are not sensitive to the index year chosen, because 
the KKZ rule of law index does not vary dramatically over time.
6   
D.  Depositor Monitoring 
We use the level of deposit insurance to measure the intensity of depositor monitoring. More 
specifically, we compute, for each country i, the inverse of the ratio of deposit insurance 




i Capita Per GDP Limit Coverage
Monitoring Depositor    (2) 
                                                 
5 KKZ data set and its description are available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html. See 
Haselmann et al. (2010) on the effects of alternative legal changes on bank lending in transition economies. 
6 The correlation between the 2004 data and those from other years runs from .91 to .98.  10 
 
The coverage ratios are for 2000, and are taken from (Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001). We use 
the inverse of the deposit coverage ratios in our index so as to allow this variable to capture 
potential positive effects of depositor monitoring, and to be consistent with our treatment of the 
other sources of monitoring and enforcement, such as rule of law.
7 We also attempt to capture 
the difference in the anticipated coverage by creating a dummy variable for coinsurance which is 
found to strengthen the intensity of market monitoring in the literature (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004). Coinsurance mechanisms require depositors to bear part of the costs of a 
banking failure. Our dummy variable equals one if a country has any such arrangement, and zero 
otherwise. 
E.  Other Control Variables 
We include the initial level of private credit to GDP (i.e., in 1990) in our regressions to control 
for the possibility that countries with better developed banking sectors tend to experience slower 
credit growth. These conditional convergence effects were first made known in the context of 
cross-country growth regressions, but they have also proved important in financial development 
regressions.
8 We also include the growth rate of GDP per capita and the inflation rate as 
macroeconomic controls. Both are averaged over the full sample period. We expect private credit 
growth to be faster in countries with low inflation and high growth, though inflation and private 
credit growth might be positively related in an expanding economy. The data on macroeconomic 
controls are from the World Development Indicators database maintained by the World Bank. 
Summary statistics for all variables used in the regressions are in Table 1.  Correlation 
coefficients are reported in Table 2.  Neither the correlation between credit growth and related 
lending nor the correlation between our index of depositor monitoring and related lending is 
significant.  Similarly, the correlations between the related lending index and our control 
variables are also insignificant, except for the negative correlation with GDP growth.  We will 
                                                 
7 One potential issue with the construction of Depositor Monitoring is the treatment of countries without explicit 
deposit insurance.  We assume that the anticipated coverage is not zero and yet small for these countries, and set the 
value of Depositor Monitoring for those non-deposit insurance countries to the highest value from the countries with 
explicit insurance (i.e., the lowest coverage limit relative to GDP per capita). However, the implicit insurance can be 
quite large if government faces a credibility problem without a legally binding coverage limit. In a robustness check, 
we treat these countries as having the most generous coverage. Our central results turn out to be robust to the 
treatment of these countries. 
8 Our results are robust to the exclusion of initial private credit (and other macroeconomic controls). These results 
are not shown to conserve space. 11 
 
deal with the potential endogeneity of related lending in multiple ways in the section on 
robustness checks. Before we present our base models, however, we note that the index is not 
related to measures of credit growth or institutional quality in any straightforward way.  
2.2  Regression Model 
Our baseline regression is: 
Credit Growthi = β0 + β1Related Lendingi + β2Rule of Lawi + β3Depositor Monitoringi  
+ β4Coinsurancei + β5Initital Crediti + β6Macro Controlsi + εi  (3) 
where Credit Growthi is the rate of growth in the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP in 
country i from 1990 to 2007. Related Lending is the related lending index, Rule of Law is the 
KKZ rule of law index, Depositor Monitoring is the inverse of the insurance coverage-to-GDP 
per capita ratio, Coinsurance is a dummy variable equaling one if a country requires depositors 
to bear part of the costs of a banking failure, and zero otherwise. Initial Credit is the ratio of 
private credit to GDP in 1990, and Macro Controls are the two macroeconomic variables 
(inflation and GDP growth) described above. 
In order to examine whether the effects of related lending depend on the institutional and 
regulatory environment, we add the interactions between Related Lending and other moderating 
variables (Rule of Law, Depositor Monitoring, and Coinsurance) as follows:  
Credit Growthi = β0 + β1Related Lendingi + β2Rule of Lawi + β3Depositor Monitoringi  
+ β4Coinsurancei+ β5(Related Lendingi)*(Rule of Lawi) 
+ β6(Related Lendingi)*(Depositor Monitoringi)+ β7(Related Lendingi)*(Coinsurancei) 
+ β8Initital Crediti + β9Macro Controlsi + εi  (4) 
In this specification, positive coefficients for (Related Lending)*(Rule of Law), (Related 
Lending)*(Depositor Monitoring) , and (Related Lending)*(Coinsurance) would suggest that 
rule of law and limitations on deposit insurance coverage enable related lending to have a 
positive effect on credit growth.  12 
 
3.  Regression Results 
The base results appear in Table 3. In the first column, we include only the related lending index 
and the control variables (initial private credit/GDP, inflation and real GDP growth). The 
coefficient for Related Lending is insignificant indicating that on average related lending is not 
strongly associated with private credit growth. Even when we add Rule of Law to the regressions 
in column 2, thus providing some institutional context, the coefficient on Related Lending 
remains insignificant.  Rule of law enters the regression with the expected sign and significance. 
These results suggest that, on average, rule of law is a powerful determinant of banking 
development while related lending does not seem to be important.  
When we introduce the interaction between Rule of Law and Related Lending in 
specification 3, however, we do find strong evidence of nonlinearity. The negative coefficient for 
(un-interacted) Related Lending and the positive coefficient for the interaction of Related 
Lending with Rule of Law indicate that the impact of related lending is negative when rule of 
law is weak and yet, turns positive when rule of law is sufficiently strong.  In particular, based on 
the coefficient estimates of specification 3, related lending is positively associated with private 
credit growth for countries that score above 5.46 on the Rule of Law index.
9 This critical value is 
just below the 60
th percentile value of the Rule of Law index, suggesting that the positive effects 
of related lending are likely only in a relatively small group of countries with good institutions, 
mostly OECD countries.  
This result also suggests that although the pernicious effects of related lending are 
evident only for countries with weak rule of law, the effect is quantitatively important for this 
group of countries. Consider an experiment in which the Related Lending index rises by one 
standard deviation for countries at the 25th percentile in terms of Rule of Law index (4.45).
10 
According to the results in specification 3 in Table 3, such an increase in permissiveness of 
related lending is associated with a 1.5 percentage point decline in the annual growth rate of 
                                                 
9 For reference, the countries with scores closest to 5.46 are Malaysia (5.52) and Costa Rica (5.57). 
10 For reference, the countries with scores closest to 4.45 are Bolivia (4.45) and Honduras (4.39). 13 
 
private credit/GDP, not a trivial change since the average annual growth in private credit/GDP 
across our entire sample is 3.3 percent (Table 1).
11 
Similarly, the positive coefficient on the interaction between related lending and rule of 
law suggests evidence of nonlinearity in the effects of rule of law. The point estimates in 
specification 3 suggest that the effect of an improvement in the rule of law is to increase private 
credit for virtually all countries, which is consistent with the result of specification 2,
12 but this 
positive effect is even more powerful when bank regulations permit related lending.
13  
Specifications 4-8 of Table 3 include Depositor Monitoring. Whether Depositor 
Monitoring appears alone (models 4 and 6) or is interacted with our index of related lending 
(models 5 and 7), it is only significantly associated with private credit growth in one model (5), 
and then only at the 10 percent level. The results (or non-results) are not due to the absence of 
control for Rule of Law.  We include it (specifications 6 and 7), and then interact it with related 
lending (specification 8)—and obtain the same results.   These results are also robust to 
incorporating an additional measure of deposit insurance, namely the dummy variable for 
coinsurance, which we interact with related lending (specification 9).  Taken as a group, 
specifications 4-9 indicate that depositors might not be effective monitors of looting by bank 
insiders. Nevertheless, related lending tends to promote credit growth in countries with strong 
rule of law even when we control for Depositor Monitoring (Specifications 6, 7, and 9). When 
                                                 
11 John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) advance a theory in which corporate boards can craft management contracts so 
as to promote first-best value-maximizing investment choices by the bank.  The implication is that our results might 
be biased, because one would think that such strong institutions of corporate governance might be more prevalent in 
environments in which the rule of law is weak.  It is not possible, unfortunately, to operationalize their theoretical 
framework cross-nationally.  There are indices that capture the power of minority shareholders to police corporate 
boards (e.g., La Porta, et. a., 1998), but there are not comparable cross-national indices that capture the ability of 
boards to control management.  We note, however, that this potential source of bias works against our hypothesis: if 
weak rule of law is mitigated by institutions that allow boards to control management, then our regressions are 
underestimating the effect of related lending on credit growth in weak rule of law environments. 
12 To be more specific, the coefficients for model 3 imply that only for countries with related lending scores below 
20 would the relationship between rule of law and private credit growth be negative. No country in the dataset has a 
related lending score below 19. For the lone negative value, corresponding to the country with a related lending 
score of 19 (Thailand), we cannot reject the hypothesis that rule of law has no effect on private credit growth. For all 
those above 35 (62 of 74 countries) the model implies a positive, significant relationship between rule of law and 
private credit growth at the 5% error level. 








percentile level of related lending in Appendix 1. 14 
 
rule of law is weak but related lending is permitted, however, private credit grows more slowly 
than in countries that do not permit related lending.
14    
4.  Probing for Mechanisms 
Thus far, we have shown that the effects of related lending are highly heterogeneous, depending 
crucially on institutional quality. In this section, we search for mechanisms, in order to provide 
more specifics about the policies, institutions, and contexts that increase the likelihood that 
related lending makes a positive contribution to the development of banking systems. 
The theoretical literature on looting suggests that the incentives for insiders to expropriate 
outsiders are particularly strong during an economic crisis.  In a crisis, bank insiders find it more 
difficult to reimburse depositors and continue operating as a bank, and as a result, the insiders 
find it in their interest to make loans to themselves, and then default on those loans in order to 
save their non-bank enterprises (e.g., Akerlof and Romer, 1993, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Zamarripa, 2003). Hence, theory suggests another dimension of nonlinearity. That is, the 
pernicious effects of related lending are likely to be most pronounced for countries that permit 
non-financial firms to own banks, while ownership of non-financial firms by banks is less 
relevant.
15 Moreover, these differential effects should be quantitatively more important during a 
crisis. 
To test these hypotheses, we de-compose our index to examine which specific group of 
actors is driving our main findings. To be specific, we use the answer to question 3 from Box 1 
on whether banks are restricted from owning non-financial firms as our measure of related 
lending in Table 4, Model 1.  In Model 2, we use question 4 on whether non-financial firms are 
restricted from owning banks.  
                                                 
14 To conserve space in Table 3, we do not show all possible model permutations. For example, the co-insurance 
variable does not appear in the simple models on the left hand side of the table that do not incorporate interaction 
terms, and model 7 doesn’t include all possible interactions between rule of law, monitoring by depositors, and 
related lending (because it leaves out rule of law*depositor monitoring). We have however run models with all 
possible permutations of the interaction terms using the related lending, rule of law, depositor monitoring, and 
coinsurance variables (available from the authors). Our main results for related lending and the interaction between 
related lending and rule of law hold in all of those specifications.  
15 In fact, a banker who owns a downstream firm might be inclined to loot it to save his bank. 15 
 
Bank ownership of firms has no significant association with credit growth, nor does its 
interaction with the rule of law.  By contrast, firm ownership of banks is negatively associated 
with private credit growth, while its interaction with rule of law is positive. The magnitude of 
these two coefficients implies that for countries with the highest scores for rule of law, related 
firm ownership of banks has no significant effect on credit growth.  For all others, the effects are 
negative. These results suggest that non-financial firms are more likely to loot their banks than 
other types of bank owners when the rule of law is weak. 
In columns 3 and 4, we use single and related party ownership limits as our proxies for 
the permissiveness of related lending.  Coefficients for both variables are negative and 
significant, while their interactions with rule of law are positive and highly significant.  The 
pattern suggests that in countries where rule of law is strong, less stringent limits on single and 
related party ownership of banks contribute to more rapid growth in private credit. 
Model 5 presents the results for a sub-sample of countries that experienced a banking 
crisis during the 1990s, which we identify from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Model 6 presents 
the results for a sub-sample of countries that did not have a banking crisis. The firm ownership of 
banks variable and its interaction with the rule of law are both significant and of the expected 
signs for crisis countries (Model 5).  Neither is significant for non-crisis countries (Model 6).
16 
These results suggest that the pernicious effects of related lending are caused by a combination 
of three factors: weak rule of law; regulations that allow non-financial companies to own banks; 
and an economic crisis that creates incentives for the owners of the non-financial firms to save 
those enterprises by looting their banks. 
5.  Robustness Checks 
In this section, we address potential econometric concerns, and also demonstrate the robustness 
of our main result and offer additional evidence that the relationship that we have found is a 
causal one. 
                                                 
16 We note that the stark differences in results for crisis and non-crisis countries for the firm ownership of banks 
variable are not evident for either the single or related party ownership variables. 16 
 
5.1  Replacing Rule of Law with More Exogenous Proxies 
The first concern is that institutional quality might be endogenous to unobservable political 
factors that affect credit growth; e.g., governments that are captured by incumbent business 
interests might deliberately block institutional reform to keep the financial system from 
developing. To address this concern, we replace our measure of institutional quality – the rule of 
law – with variables that capture fundamental exogenous factors that drive institutional 
outcomes.  Work by Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock (2006) shows that ethnic fractionalization 
undermines social cohesion, which undermines the rule of law, which in turn affects economic 
growth.
17  Obviously, any institutional measure is going to contain some component that is 
endogenous to politics and political institutions.  One would be hard pressed, however, to argue 
that ethnic fractionalization is caused by political factors. 
We therefore substitute ethnic fractionalization for the rule of law variable in Table 5, 
models 1 and 2. Related lending is positive and significant in both specifications, while related 
lending interacted with ethnic fractionalization is negative and significant.  The regressions 
indicate that at low levels of social cohesion, the impact of related lending on credit growth is 
negative, but that at high levels of social cohesion related lending has a positive impact on credit 
growth.
18  These findings are therefore consistent with those we obtained from the rule of law 
regressions.  They also provide additional information about the type of society in which related 
lending is less likely to offer benefits. 
                                                 
17 They also show that these measures of social cohesion pass over-identification tests for excludability in growth 
regressions. 
18 The measure of ethnic fractionalization used by Easterly et al. ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating 
more fractionalization. In our sample, the mean value is 0.44 and the highest value is 0.93 for Uganda. The lowest 
values are for Japan (.01) and Korea (.002). One might interpret the positive coefficient for ethnic fractionalization 
as indicating that at low levels of related lending fractionalization has a positive effect on private credit growth. 
However, that coefficient can be explained in the context of the values for related lending in our sample and its size 
relative to the coefficient on the interaction term. At the lowest levels of related lending in our sample, 
fractionalization is positively associated with private credit growth, but the relationship is never significantly 
different from zero, and thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between fractionalization 
and private credit growth for those countries. At higher levels of related lending, the relationship is negative and 
becomes significant for related lending values near 50. So, for about a quarter of the sample we find no significant 
relationship for fractionalization. For the remaining three-quarters we find a negative, significant relationship, as one 
would expect.   17 
 
5.2  An Instrument for Related Lending 
Though ethnic fractionalization poses fewer endogeneity problems than rule of law, the 
substitution of these variables does not address the potential endogeneity of the related lending 
policies themselves, which could also be driven by similar unobservable political factors. The 
difficulty, of course, is finding an appropriate instrument for those policies.
19 We propose as a 
candidate the index of official supervisory powers constructed by BCL (2001). That index, 
which is described in detail in Appendix 2, is based on sixteen questions about the powers 
granted to supervisors in monitoring and disciplining banks. We view this as an indication of a 
society’s general propensity to use official mechanisms to monitor market activities. To the 
extent that a society views its banking sector as being tightly regulated and supervised, fears 
about the negative effects of related lending might be diminished. We would therefore expect a 
positive relationship between our related lending index and the BCL index of official supervisory 
powers, and indeed the correlation between the two is 0.42, which is significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
When we use the official supervisory powers index as an instrumental variable in a two-
stage least squares regression, the index of related lending is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (Table 5, column 3).  When we then restrict the sample to countries that 
began our period of study with relatively low levels of credit (private credit/GDP < 0.7 in 1990), 
the index of related lending is negative and significant at the 5 percent level (column 4). This 
filter excludes nine countries from the active observation set, eight of which are industrialized.
20  
Similar results hold when we restrict the sample using other variables that measure institutional 
or financial development. The results from the instrumental variable regressions therefore 
indicate that related lending is more strongly associated with slower private credit growth in less 
developed countries, which offers support for the notion that the relationships that we uncovered 
in our baseline regressions are causal. 
                                                 
19 Ethnic fractionalization is not a good instrument because we have no strong prediction about the relationship 
between it and our index of the permissiveness of related lending. Indeed, the significant results in models 1 and 2 of 
Table 4 derive from the fact that related lending is permitted in some highly fractionalized societies and in some 
homogeneous societies. The correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the related lending index is 0.15 and 
not significant at the p=.10 level; i.e., ethnic fragmentation would not be a strong instrument for related lending even 
if it is exogenous. 
20 Those industrialized countries are Switzerland, France, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
the United Kingdom. 18 
 
5.3  Unobserved Heterogeneity 
A skeptical reader might be inclined to think that our regressions might be picking up the effect 
of some unobserved variable that jointly determines the growth of credit and the laws governing 
related lending.  Such a reader might point to either of two types of unobserved variables that 
could be driving our results: those that proxy for a generalized financial boom; and those that 
proxy for a weak institutional environment.   
We address these concerns about unobserved heterogeneity in Table 6. Models 2, 3, and 
4 add controls in a stepwise fashion to address the hypothesis that a generalized financial boom, 
rooted in the capital markets, is driving our results: Model 2 controls for the rate of growth of the 
capitalization of the stock market; Model 3 controls for the rate of growth of the ratio of the 
capitalization of the stock market to GDP; and Model 4 controls for the degree to which the 
capital market is liberalized, using the Chinn-Ito Index of Capital Market Openness. None of the 
three control variables enters the regressions as statistically significant, nor does their inclusion 
affect the sign or statistical significance of the coefficients on related lending and the rule of law 
interacted with related lending (see Model 1 for the base results). Models 5 and 6 control for the 
possibility of a generalized boom in the banking sector, by adding a variable for the rate of 
growth of the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (Model 5) and for the rate of growth of the ratio of 
bank credit to bank deposits (Model 6).  Both of these variables enter the regressions with the 
expected sign and significance (indeed, it would be very odd to find that credit growth was not 
associated with deposit growth), but neither affects the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance 
of the variables of interest in our base results.
21  Models 7, 8, 9, and 10 address concerns about a 
weak institutional environment driving our results, by adding controls for government ownership 
of banks (following La Porta et. al 2002), corruption, property rights protection, and financial 
freedom in a stepwise fashion. None of these controls enter as statistically significant, nor do 
they have a material effect on the variables of interest in our base regression: the related lending 
index remains negative and highly significant, while the rule of law interacted with related 
lending remains positive and highly significant.  In short, it does not appear that our results—that 
                                                 
21 To make sure that rapid growth in credit in the run-up to the recent crisis is not driving our main findings, we also 
estimated models for the period 1990 to 2000 and 1990 to 2004. Our main findings for related lending and its 
interaction with rule of law also hold in those models. 19 
 
related lending has positive effects on the development of the banking sector when there is 
strong rule of law—are a statistical artifact.  
5.4  A Direct Channel between Related Lending and Non-Bank Forms of Finance 
A particularly skeptical reader might want to argue that we have picked up a real effect, but have 
mis-specified the chain of causality: related lending allows the capital markets to grow faster 
than otherwise when rule of law is strong; bank credit is expanding as a second-order effect.  
We address this hypothesis in Table 7.  We switch the dependent variable, from the 
growth of credit to: the rate of growth of the ratio of the stock market capitalization to GDP 
(Model 1); the rate of growth of the ratio of the total value traded on the stock market to GDP 
(Model 2); and the rate of growth of total liquid liabilities to GDP (Model 3).  The results 
indicate that we have not mis-specified the chain of causality: the coefficients for related lending, 
as well as for related lending interacted with rule of law are far from statistical significance in all 
three models. The implication is clear: related lending affects financial development by working 
through bank credit.  
5.5  Split Sample Tests 
When conditional effects emerge from interaction terms, one wants to be sure that the result is 
not caused by outlying cases at either end of the tail. We therefore employ split sample 
techniques as a robustness test, and present the results in Table 8.  We divide the dataset into 
three sub-samples based on the rule of law, and estimate separate regressions, without the 
interaction term, on each sub-sample. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on the bottom third of the 
sample. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on the middle third of the sample. Models 5 and 6 are 
estimated on the upper third of the sample. We estimate each model twice: first with related 
lending alone, and then with related lending and the rule of law.  All of the models produce 
coefficients that are consistent with our base result: related lending is negatively and 
significantly linked to private credit in the bottom third of the sample; there is a positive, but not 
significant, relationship in the middle third; and there is a positive and significant relationship in 
the upper third.  20 
 
5.6  Look Ahead Bias 
One final concern is ahead bias. The rules about related lending from BCL that we use to 
construct our index are from 1998-1999 and 2002.  However, our measure of private credit 
growth starts in 1991, which means that we have some countries in the data set that had financial 
crises before 1998-1999, and that might have changed their related lending rules as a result of 
those crises. Since we lack systematic information about which countries changed their related 
lending policies in the wake of a banking crisis, we carry out two separate tests to rule out this 
possibility. First, we directly control for the occurrence of a banking crisis. If banking crises that 
occurred in the 1990s are driving the correlation between credit growth and our related lending 
index, our main results should disappear or weaken dramatically. The results show that our 
central results are robust to adding a crisis control (Table 9).
22  
In addition, in order to be sure that our results are robust, we truncate our dataset to the 
period since 1998, re-estimate the regressions, and present the results in Table 10.  We note that 
this procedure implies a quite stringent test: not only is the window of time quite short (we are 
measuring the rate of growth of credit over only ten years), but this particular period is known 
for the absence of the kinds of banking crises that are predicted to cause looting via related 
lending.  Indeed, the period is often referred to as the great moderation. 
The stringent nature of the test does affect our results, but not in a decisive way.  Model 1 
indicates that related lending has neither positive nor negative effects on its own, and that there is 
a strong, positive correlation between the rule of law and credit growth.  These are the same 
qualitative results we obtain in our base regression (Table 3). When we interact related lending 
and rule of law in Model 2, we obtain results with the same signs as in Table 3, but they are not 
statistically significant.  In order to examine robustness, we therefore recode the rule of law 
variable as a dummy (countries that have a rule of law score in the 66
th percentile and above =1), 
and re-estimate the regressions.  We report the results in Model 3, and find that related lending is 
associated with faster credit growth in countries with very strong rule of law. In order to make 
sure that this result is robust, we then follow the same procedure we applied in Table 8: we split 
the sample into thirds based on rule of law scores at the beginning of the period (1998); and then 
                                                 
22 In addition, the correlation between the related lending index and the indicator of financial crisis turns out to be 
weak (-0.22), suggesting that look ahead bias is unlikely to be driving our key results. 21 
 
re-estimate the regressions on each of the three sub-samples.  We obtain results that are 
qualitatively similar: related lending is negatively associated with private credit growth in the 
bottom third of the sample; there is a positive, but not significant, relationship in the middle third 
of the sample; and there is a positive and significant relationship in the upper third of the sample.  
6.  Conclusions 
We find that there are institutional conditions under which related lending is negative for private 
credit growth, and conditions under which it is positive for private credit growth. In particular, 
when the rule of law is strong, related lending is associated with faster credit growth.  We 
suggest that this result holds because fear of legal sanction keeps bank insiders from looting their 
own banks.  At the same time, the banking system benefits from the positive features of related 
lending, such as the ability to overcome information asymmetries and monitor borrowers at low 
cost.  When rule of law is weak, however, related lending is associated with slower credit 
growth, presumably because bank insiders can loot their own banks with impunity.  
Unfortunately for policy makers in developing countries, the institution building 
associated with firmly establishing the rule of law is a long-term process. Moreover, we find no 
readily available substitutes for rule of law in preventing the abuses associated with related 
lending. For example, we hypothesized that the institution of depositor monitoring might also 
play a role in determining the effects of related lending. However, we did not detect any 
relationship between related lending and private credit growth in the countries where depositors 
have strong incentives to monitor banks.  We speculate that depositor monitoring is too blunt an 
instrument to detect when related lending is being used in ways that hurt banks.  
This leaves policy makers in developing countries in a quandary: How can they tailor 
related lending policies so that they promote financial development when establishing the rule of 
law is a long-term proposition and depositors cannot detect abuses associated with insider 
lending? It is little wonder, therefore, that international financial institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank tend to discourage related lending in their client countries. 
At the same time, however, our robustness checks offer clues about situations in which 
related lending is most likely to lead to abuses by insiders, and those clues could offer some 22 
 
guidance to policy makers. For example, related lending appears most likely to lead to abuses in 
highly fractionalized societies. It also appears that ownership of banks by non-financial firms 
poses a greater threat of looting than ownership of non-financial firms by banks, and that this 
threat is most pronounced in times of systemic crisis. Finally, expanding the official powers of 
bank supervisors does not appear to root out related lending abuses, especially in less developed 
countries.  
Taken as a group, our results indicate that there is no single ―best policy‖ regarding 
related lending.  Whether or not policy makers should deter bankers from extending credit to 
themselves and their business associates crucially depends on how well they can adapt those 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Private credit / GDP growth, 1990-2007  74  103.330  4.115  86.142  112.950 
Related lending index   74  64.951  22.573  19  100 
Rule of law  74  5.283  1.020  3.5  7.01 
Monitoring by depositors  67  1.447  1.172  0.04  2.71 
Initial private credit / GDP  74  0.385  0.327  0.032  1.561 
Inflation, 1990-2007  74  9.754  15.538  0.529  107.692 
GDP growth rate, 1990-2007  74  3.759  1.546  0.253  7.224 
Ethnic fractionalization  74  0.416  0.273  0.002  0.879 
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Table 2.  Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Variables  
  
Private credit/GDP  
growth, 1990-2007 
Related  







GDP growth,  
1990-2007 
Private credit/GDP  
growth, 1990-2007  1                   
  74             
Related  
lending index  -0.1018  1           
  0.3879             
  74  74           
Rule of law  0.2897  0.0133  1         
  0.0123  0.9103           
  74  74  74         
Monitoring  
by depositors  0.067  0.1787  -0.1187  1       
  0.59  0.1479  0.3385         
  67  67  67  67       
Initial  
private credit/GDP  -0.1416  0.1116  0.7078  -0.1967  1     
  0.2288  0.344  0  0.1106       
  74  74  74  67  74     
Inflation,  
1990-2007  0.0518  0.0936  -0.2469  -0.1076  -0.1302  1   
  0.661  0.4278  0.0339  0.386  0.2687     
  74  74  74  67  74  74   
GDP growth rate,  
1990-2007  0.182  -0.236  -0.0077  0.1923  -0.1892  -0.209  1 
  0.1206  0.043  0.9481  0.119  0.1065  0.0739   
   74  74  74  67  74  74  74 
 
Notes. For each variable listed in the table, the first line is the correlation coefficient, the second is its p-value, and the third is the number of 
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Table 3:  Base Results 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1990 to 2007, obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The related lending index is the average of 
responses to four questions on related lending from the database of bank regulation and supervision created by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000, 2003). Rule of law comes from the index developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. Deposit monitoring is measured as the inverse of the ratio of deposit insurance coverage per capita GDP. The coinsurance variable is a dummy equal to one if 
depositors are required to bear some of the costs of banking failures and zero otherwise.  
 
Dependent variable:                            
Private credit/GDP growth, 1990-2007  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                             
Related Lending Index  -0.0109  -0.00611  -0.370***  0.000982  0.0350  -0.342***  -0.310***  -0.00202  -0.206 
  (-0.525)  (-0.340)  (-3.209)  (0.0495)  (1.292)  (-3.611)  (-3.262)  (-0.110)  (-1.407) 
Rule of Law    3.275***  -1.318      -1.061  -0.936  2.616***  -0.861 
    (4.952)  (-1.141)      (-1.074)  (-0.968)  (3.151)  (-0.843) 
Related Lending x Rule of Law      0.0678***      0.0623***  0.0600***    0.0536*** 
      (3.428)      (3.909)  (3.890)    (3.274) 
Monitoring by Depositors        0.0632  1.516*  0.0577  0.892  -1.197  5.350 
        (0.170)  (1.683)  (0.181)  (1.129)  (-0.576)  (1.278) 
Monitoring by Depositors x Related Lending           -0.0239    -0.0137    -0.0413 
          (-1.442)    (-1.012)    (-0.755) 
Monitoring by Depositors x Rule of Law                0.257   
                (0.644)   
Coinsurance                  11.27 
                  (1.084) 
Coinsurance x Related Lending                  -0.0700 
                  (-0.519) 
Initial Private Credit/GDP  -1.169  -8.437***  -9.077***  -1.916  -1.862  -9.374***  -9.275***  -8.787***  -9.688*** 
  (-0.851)  (-5.628)  (-6.696)  (-1.448)  (-1.376)  (-5.831)  (-5.642)  (-4.806)  (-6.660) 
Inflation, 1990-2007  0.0213  0.0496**  0.0518**  0.00647  0.00333  0.0463***  0.0440**  0.0332*  0.0475** 
  (1.039)  (2.327)  (2.646)  (0.330)  (0.163)  (2.775)  (2.466)  (1.899)  (2.532) 
GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2007  0.445  0.247  0.323  0.216  0.334  0.235  0.297  -0.00721  0.373 
  (1.212)  (0.752)  (1.247)  (0.563)  (0.859)  (0.890)  (1.064)  (-0.0205)  (1.337) 
Constant  102.6***  88.26***  112.9***  103.4***  101.0***  112.0***  110.0***  92.73***  97.30*** 
  (50.82)  (22.53)  (16.58)  (46.50)  (39.40)  (18.50)  (18.06)  (20.07)  (8.620) 
Observations  74  74  74  67  67  67  67  67  67 
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Table 4.  De-Composition of Related Lending Index 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1990 to 2007, obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The related lending index is the average of 
responses to four questions on related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000, 2003), Rule of law comes from the index 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. Deposit monitoring is measured as the inverse of the ratio of deposit insurance coverage per capita GDP. Restrictions on ownership variables are 
from the four components that comprise the related lending index (Box 1). Each component is equal to 0 if ownership is prohibited, 33.3 if restricted, 66.7 if permitted, or 100 if unrestricted.  
 
Dependent variable:              Crisis  Non-Crisis 
Private credit/GDP growth, 1990-2007  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                  
Monitoring by Depositors  0.102  -0.0253  0.0297  0.112     
  (0.315)  (-0.0789)  (0.0934)  (0.357)     
Initial Private Credit/GDP  -8.662***  -9.408***  -9.194***  -8.810***  -9.113***  -8.642*** 
  (-4.665)  (-5.123)  (-5.741)  (-5.595)  (-5.335)  (-4.655) 
Inflation, 1990-2007  0.0348*  0.0363**  0.0431**  0.0487***  0.0500***  0.0473 
  (1.851)  (2.559)  (2.326)  (2.712)  (3.872)  (0.888) 
GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2007  0.0380  0.218  0.207  0.196  0.253  0.412 
  (0.112)  (0.805)  (0.844)  (0.607)  (0.988)  (1.106) 
Rule of Law  3.489***  0.0707  0.584  0.411  -1.659  1.485 
  (3.165)  (0.0652)  (0.883)  (0.627)  (-1.306)  (0.844) 
Restrictions on banks' ownership of firms  0.0561           
  (0.567)           
Restrictions on banks' ownership of firms  -0.0102           
          x Rule of Law  (-0.575)           
Restrictions on firms' ownership of banks    -0.256**      -0.353**  -0.181 
    (-2.589)      (-2.778)  (-1.072) 
Restrictions on firms' ownership of banks    0.0472***      0.0621**  0.0331 
          x Rule of Law    (2.701)      (2.709)  (1.147) 
Restrictions on ownership by single party      -0.176***       
      (-3.525)       
Restrictions on ownership by single party      0.0335***       
          x Rule of Law      (3.902)       
Restrictions on ownership by related parties        -0.192***     
        (-3.671)     
Restrictions on ownership by related parties        0.0352***     
          x Rule of Law        (4.065)     
Constant  87.75***  105.9***  102.6***  103.7***  115.1***  97.23*** 
  (16.31)  (16.32)  (25.36)  (24.68)  (15.69)  (9.016) 
Observations  67  67  67  67  22  52 
R-squared  0.362  0.434  0.465  0.466  0.657  0.407   31 
Table 5.  Addressing Endogeneity Issues  
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Models 1 and 2 estimated via ordinary least squares; models 3 and 4 estimated 
using instrumental variables regressions. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1990 to 2007, obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The related lending index is the average of 
responses to four questions on related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000, 2003), and was instrumented with an index of 
official supervisory powers in columns (3) and (4). In column 4, the sample is restricted to countries that had low initial levels of banking sector development as reflected in a ration of Private 
Credit/GDP below 0.70. Rule of law comes from the index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. Deposit monitoring is measured as the inverse of the ratio of deposit insurance coverage 
per capita GDP. Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two random individuals from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (Mauro 1995).  
 
Dependent variable:             
Private credit/GDP growth, 1990-2007  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 





              
Related Lending Index  0.0790***  0.0732**  -0.211  -0.194** 
  (2.772)  (2.455)  (-1.530)  (-2.181) 
Monitoring by Depositors    0.402  1.026  0.455 
    (1.035)  (1.279)  (0.811) 
Initial Private Credit/GDP  -3.315**  -3.016*  -7.431**  -17.65*** 
  (-2.133)  (-1.924)  (-2.219)  (-3.519) 
Inflation, 1990-2007  0.0308  0.0234  0.0739***  0.0896*** 
  (1.393)  (1.190)  (2.867)  (3.057) 
GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2007  0.655*  0.452  -0.538  -0.332 
  (1.898)  (1.268)  (-1.027)  (-0.735) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  6.505*  6.266     
  (1.672)  (1.441)     
Ethnic Fractionalization x Related Lending  -0.186**  -0.171**     
  (-2.509)  (-2.169)     
Rule of Law      3.321***  3.917*** 
      (3.197)  (3.856) 
Constant  99.21***  99.64***  102.3***  100.8*** 
  (41.59)  (41.43)  (11.72)  (18.96) 
Observations  74  67  63  54 
R-squared  0.243  0.187  -1.022  -0.533   32 
Table 6.  More Controls 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least 
squares. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1990 to 2007, obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The 
related lending index is the average of responses to four questions on related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created by 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000, 2003). Rule of law comes from the index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. Data on stock market 
capitalization (growth), Bank deposits/GDP Growth and Bank Credit/Bank Deposits Growth are also from the World Bank Financial Structure Database. The 
Chinn-Ito Index of Capital Market Openness measures a country’s degree of capital market openness (Chinn and Ito, 2007).  
Government Ownership of Banks is from the database of bank regulation and supervision (Barth, Caprio, Levine). The Corruption index (1998-2007), Property 
rights index (1995-2007) and Financial freedom index (1995-2007) come from the Index of Economic freedom, created by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall 
Street Journal.  
 
 
Dependent variable:                               
Private credit/GDP growth, 1990-2007  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Related Lending Index   -0.370***  -0.197**  -0.190**  -0.371***  -0.354***  -0.371***  -0.258***  -0.353***  -0.367***  -0.367*** 
  (-3.209)  (-2.346)  (-2.293)  (-3.216)  (-3.090)  (-3.298)  (-2.894)  (-3.003)  (-3.114)  (-3.108) 
Rule of Law  -1.318  0.177  0.343  -1.240  -1.122  -1.650  -0.461  -2.936  -1.358  -1.475 
  (-1.141)  (0.217)  (0.425)  (-1.071)  (-0.997)  (-1.445)  (-0.475)  (-1.665)  (-0.939)  (-1.182) 
Related Lending x Rule of Law  0.0678***  0.0394***  0.0378**  0.0678***  0.0655***  0.0668***  0.0493***  0.0641***  0.0670***  0.0667*** 
  (3.428)  (2.734)  (2.664)  (3.422)  (3.340)  (3.477)  (3.227)  (3.157)  (3.338)  (3.343) 
Initial Private Credit/GDP  -9.077***  -9.009***  -8.587***  -9.522***  -10.11***  -7.906***  -8.629***  -9.036***  -8.356***  -8.482*** 
  (-6.696)  (-6.080)  (-6.149)  (-6.899)  (-6.516)  (-5.724)  (-6.238)  (-6.791)  (-6.326)  (-6.478) 
Inflation, 1990-2007  0.0518**  -0.00160  0.0424  0.0502**  0.0529***  0.0515***  0.0387**  0.0552***  0.0558**  0.0573** 
  (2.646)  (-0.0475)  (1.246)  (2.489)  (2.715)  (2.657)  (2.307)  (3.048)  (2.491)  (2.576) 
GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2007  0.323  0.461*  0.431  0.268  0.219  0.391  0.310  0.367  0.327  0.327 
  (1.247)  (1.801)  (1.675)  (1.028)  (0.826)  (1.563)  (1.259)  (1.396)  (1.136)  (1.149) 
Stock Market Capitalization Growth, 1990-2007    0.434                 
    (1.252)                 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP Growth, 1990-2007      -0.209               
      (-0.509)                 33 
Chinn-Ito Index of Capital Market Openness, 1990-2007        -0.0900             
        (-0.228)             
Bank deposits/GDP Growth, 1990-2007          7.033***           
          (3.145)           
Bank Credit/Bank Deposits Growth, 1990-2007            12.01***         
            (2.887)         
Government Ownership of Banks              0.00671       
              (0.451)       
Corruption Index                1.853     
                (1.266)     
Property Rights Index                  -1.95e-05   
                  (-0.000359)   
Financial Freedom Index                    0.0169 
                    (0.564) 
Constant  112.9***  103.6***  102.5***  112.9***  112.0***  113.9***  107.5***  111.5***  112.6***  112.4*** 
  (16.58)  (20.58)  (20.53)  (16.83)  (17.27)  (16.78)  (17.86)  (16.28)  (16.19)  (16.21) 
Observations  74  58  58  73  74  74  71  74  70  70 
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Table 7. Other Measure of Financial Development 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. 
Dependent variables are stock market capitalization, stock market total value traded, and liquid liabilities, taken 
from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The related lending index is the average of responses to four 
questions on related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created by Barth, Caprio 




Stock market capitalization/GDP,  
1990-2007 
Stock market total value 
traded/GDP, 1990-2007 
Liquid liabilities/GDP,  
1990-2007 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Related Lending Index   0.0217  0.0858  -0.00252 
  (1.000)  (0.620)  (-1.415) 
Rule of Law  0.463  0.0661  -0.0341 
  (1.201)  (0.0320)  (-1.286) 
Related Lending x Rule of Law  -0.00458  -0.0154  0.000413 
  (-1.085)  (-0.614)  (1.199) 
Initial Private Credit/GDP  0.499  7.978  0.112* 
  (1.595)  (1.138)  (1.707) 
Inflation, 1990-2007  0.0574***  -0.0117  -0.000244 
  (3.174)  (-0.637)  (-1.505) 
GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2007  -0.0840  0.269  0.0109 
  (-1.104)  (0.460)  (1.660) 
Constant  -2.379  -3.039  0.156 
   (-1.393)  (-0.301)  (1.120) 
Observations  58  57  72 
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Table 8.  Split Sample Analysis 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1990 to 2007, obtained from the 
World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The related lending index is the average of responses to four 
questions on related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2000, 2003). Rule of law comes from the index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobaton. The sample is split into three sub-samples based on the Rule of Law index. 
 
 
Dependent variable:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Private credit/GDP growth, 1990-2007             
  Low-level Rule of Law  Mid-level Rule of Law  High-level Rule of Law 
Related Lending Index   -0.113**  -0.121**  0.00770  0.00752  0.0499**  0.0405* 
  (-2.358)  (-2.513)  (0.335)  (0.329)  (2.487)  (1.917) 
Rule of Law    -1.326    0.982    3.512* 
    (-0.702)    (0.791)    (1.744) 
Initial Private Credit/GDP  -13.77**  -13.39**  -10.43***  -10.90***  -7.391***  -7.734*** 
  (-2.396)  (-2.290)  (-3.656)  (-3.821)  (-3.919)  (-4.675) 
Inflation, 1990-2007  0.160  0.171*  0.0318  0.0339  -0.239*  0.0727 
  (1.611)  (1.808)  (1.378)  (1.355)  (-1.867)  (0.339) 
GDP Growth Rate, 1990-2007  0.541  0.734  0.412  0.350  0.0312  0.134 
  (0.762)  (0.907)  (1.057)  (1.013)  (0.0601)  (0.243) 
Constant  107.3***  112.6***  105.1***  100.4***  106.7***  83.25*** 
   (30.28)  (13.95)  (30.60)  (12.10)  (35.17)  (5.914) 
Observations  25  25  24  24  25  25 
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Table 9.  Control for Financial Crisis 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1990 to 2007, obtained from the 
World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The related lending index is the average of responses to four 
questions on related lending drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2000, 2003). Rule of law comes from the index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobaton. The dummy variable for financial crisis comes from Caprio and Klingebiel  (2003). 
 
   (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES     
        
Related Lending Index  -0.378***  -0.352*** 
  (-3.294)  (-3.188) 
Rule of Law  -1.492  -0.762 
  (-1.321)  (-0.630) 
Related Lending x Rule of Law  0.0684***  0.0633*** 
  (3.467)  (3.352) 
Initial Private Credit/GDP  -8.840***  -9.045*** 
  (-6.722)  (-7.028) 
Inflation  0.0556***  0.0575*** 
  (3.167)  (3.135) 
GDP Growth Rate  0.300  0.297 
  (1.115)  (1.100) 
Financial Crisis  -0.673  4.293 
  (-0.856)  (0.925) 
Financial Crisis x Rule of Law    -0.987 
    (-1.226) 
Constant  114.2***  110.4*** 
  (16.77)  (15.06) 
     
Observations  74  74 
R-squared  0.485  0.495 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       37 
Table 10.  Analysis of Post-Crisis (1998-2007) Data 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models estimated via ordinary least 
squares. 
Dependent variable is the average growth rate of private credit / GDP from 1998 to 2007, obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. The 
related lending index is the average of responses to four questions on related lending in 1998 drawing on the database of bank regulation and supervision created 
by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000). Rule of law comes from the index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. Strong Rule of Law is a dummy 
equal to one if Rule of Law is above the 66
th percentile. In columns 4 to 9 the sample is split into three sub-samples based on the Rule of Law index in 1998. 
 
 
Dependent variable:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Private credit/GDP growth, 1998-2007                   
        Low-level Rule of Law  Mid-level Rule of Law  High-level Rule of Law 
Related lending index, 2000  0.0326  -0.148  -0.0157  -0.0259  -0.0271  0.0325  0.0319  0.0778**  0.0645** 
  (1.485)  (-0.785)  (-0.434)  (-0.270)  (-0.258)  (0.915)  (0.880)  (2.383)  (2.095) 
Rule of Law, 1998  4.199***  1.876      0.640    2.640    3.494 
  (4.277)  (0.885)      (0.139)    (0.803)    (1.592) 
Related lending (2000) x Rule of law (1998)    0.0323               
    (1.017)               
Strong Rule of Law (Above 66th percentile, 1998)      2.603             
      (1.040)             
Strong Rule of Law (1998) x Related lending index (2000)      0.0878*             
      (1.826)             
Private credit by deposit money banks / GDP, 1998  -9.213***  -9.412***  -8.462***  -10.89  -11.68  -7.713***  -8.092***  -9.959**  -9.275** 
  (-5.377)  (-5.440)  (-4.979)  (-1.629)  (-1.656)  (-3.562)  (-3.955)  (-2.507)  (-2.312) 
Inflation, 1998-2007  0.0484  0.0318  0.0668  0.204  0.195  -0.00931  0.0143  0.375  0.674 
  (0.619)  (0.436)  (0.837)  (1.040)  (1.092)  (-0.178)  (0.212)  (0.494)  (0.853) 
GDP growth, 1998-2007  0.248  0.224  0.613  0.348  0.333  0.399  0.363  -0.101  0.290 
  (0.611)  (0.574)  (1.467)  (0.584)  (0.567)  (0.540)  (0.497)  (-0.0938)  (0.282) 
Constant  83.06***  96.31***  103.5***  103.5***  101.2***  103.2***  89.75***  108.7***  84.49*** 
   (15.52)  (7.635)  (30.55)  (16.06)  (6.213)  (20.23)  (4.730)  (12.12)  (4.797) 
Observations  74  74  74  24  24  24  24  26  26 
R-squared  0.406  0.417  0.376  0.172  0.174  0.466  0.485  0.526  0.567 
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Appendix 1: Effects of Related Lending Conditional on Rule of Law and Effects of 
Rule of Law Conditional on Related Lending 
This table tabulates the effects of related lending on banking development (i.e. growth in 
the ratio of credit to the private sector relative to GDP) at varying levels of rule of law 
(panel A) and the effects of rule of law at varying levels of related lending (panel B) 
based on specification 3 of Table 3. 
Panel A 
Rule of Law  Effects of Related Lending 
4.45 (25th percentile)  -0.06829 
5.05  (50th percentile)  -0.02761 
6.16  (75th percentile)  0.047648 
   
Panel B 
Related Lending  Effects of Rule of Law 
47.25  (25th percentile)  1.88555 
74.25  (50th percentile)  3.71615 
83  (75th percentile)  4.3094 
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Appendix 2: Index of Official Supervisory Powers 
The questions that are used to calculate the index of official supervisory powers are:  
1.  Does  the  supervisory  agency  have  the  right  to  meet  with  external  auditors  to 
discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 
2.  Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
any  presumed  involvement  of  bank  directors  or  senior  managers  in  elicit 
activities, fraud or insider abuse? 
3.  Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 
4.  Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational 
structure? 
5.  Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
6.  Can  the  supervisory  agency  order  the  bank’s  directors  or  management  to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 
7.  Can  the  supervisory  agency  suspend  the  directors’  decision  to  distribute 
dividends? 
8.  Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute bonuses? 
9.  Can  the  supervisory  agency  suspend  the  directors’  decision  to  distribute 
management fees? 
10. Who  can  legally  declare  –  such  that  this  declaration  supersedes  the  rights  of 
shareholders – that a bank is insolvent? A) Bank supervisor; B) Court; C) Deposit 
insurance agency; D) Bank restructuring or asset management agency; E) Other. 
11. According to the Banking Law, who has authority to intervene – that is, suspend 
some or all ownership rights – a problem bank? A) Bank supervisor; B) Court; C) 
Deposit insurance agency; D) Bank restructuring or asset management agency; E) 
Other. 
12. Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or 
any other government agency supersede shareholder rights or remove and replace 
management or directors? A) Bank supervisor; B) Court; C) Deposit insurance 
agency; D) Bank restructuring or asset management agency; E) Other. 
For questions 1-9: Yes=1: No=0. 
For  questions  10-12:  Bank  supervisor=1:  Deposit  insurance  agency=0.5;  Bank 
restructuring or asset management agency=0; 0 otherwise. 
The official supervisory powers index is constructed as the sum of these assigned 
values, with higher values indicating greater power. 
Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). 
 